A visit to a Chinese city of any size-looking up at downtown billboards, riding public transport, shopping at a mall-is to be in the presence of a Chinese celebrity endorsing a product, lifestyle or other symbols of "the good life". Celebrity in China is big business, feeding off and nourishing the advertising-led business model that underpins the commercialized media system and internet. It is also a powerful instrument in the Party-State's discursive and symbolic repertoire, used to promote regime goals and solidify new governmentalities through signalling accepted modes of behaviour for mass emulation. The multi-dimensional celebrity persona, and the public interest it stimulates in off-stage lives, requires an academic focus on the workings of celebrity separate to the products that celebrities create in their professional roles. The potential to connect with large numbers of ordinary people, and the emergence of an informal celebrity-making scene in cyberspace symptomatic of changing attitudes towards fame among Chinese people, marks the special status of celebrity within China's constrained socio-political ecology. The motivation for this article is to further scholarly understanding of how celebrity operates in China and to bring this expression of popular culture into the broader conversation about contemporary Chinese politics and society. 
and the state by removing state subsidies while maintaining restrictions on permissible content. 13 In response, the media and entertainment industries were forced to adopt advertisingled business models while keeping their output within deliberately vague, post-hoc and moving boundaries set by the state. 14 Consciously apolitical soft entertainment formats were embraced as a way of achieving both ends, with substantial demand from Chinese audiences accustomed to a diet of ideologically-driven "edutainment". The regulatory frameworks governing the conduct of the celebrity industry are supplemented by informal, soft controls, in the form of government pronouncements and state media editorials setting out norms and expectations. In 2015, for instance, SAPPRFT introduced a "Pledge on professional ethics, self-discipline for personnel in press, publications, radio, film and television." Fifty organizations across the entertainment sector promptly signed the pledge. Speaking at the launch, actress Fan Bingbing 范冰冰 declared that "to be a good actor, one must first be a good person", which notably included "abiding by the law" and promoting "truth, good and beauty". Expectations about the morality of celebrity conduct and their personal "quality" (suzhi 素质)
are not restricted to the state. As Edwards and Jeffreys note, Chinese publics care deeply about traditional virtues and the pursuit of modernity. It has identified celebrities as purveyors of "spiritual goods" (Jingshen chanpin 精神产品), exhorting them to "perform conscientiously, behave respectfully" and "take the lead in setting an example" for society to follow. 40 As
Stockmann and Gallagher conclude in their article on Chinese commercial media, the state has learned that popular vehicles can transmit political messages more effectively than "old-style
propaganda." 41 Possessors of "symbolic capital" derived from constant publicity and deliberately crafted personas, 42 Chinese celebrities have inherited the mantle of socialist role model, embodying accepted modes of behaviour for mass emulation. This includes exhibiting norms structured by class, 43 gender 44 and the "continuous striving and upward mobility" manifest in "middle class" consumption behaviours. 45 The State's expectations are established and enforced through a repertoire of formal, informal and delegated control mechanisms described in the previous section.
Under market socialism the State's social engineering (shehui gongcheng 社会工程) and moral construction (daode jianshe 道德建设) projects increasingly take the form of "governmentalities" associated with neoliberal ideas on the management of individual conduct. 46 As individual merit, material wealth and consumption have become the hallmarks of market socialist progress, elevating the "quality" and "civilization" (wenming 文明) of the Chinese people has been identified as a prerequisite for an orderly and stable modern society under continued CCP rule. 47 Individual self-improvement and learning from role models are framed by the State via the media, entertainment and curricula as patriotic acts advancing national prosperity, unity and strength. The production and consumption of celebrity in China thus takes place in a discursive context in which "quality" and "civilization" symbolize prescribed ways of behaving that underpin Hu Jintao's "harmonious and well-off society" and Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream". Yet, as Brownell points out, the discourse around "quality" and "civilization" has displaced the responsibility for progress to individuals, while masking the class structure and other systemic inequities that determine their access to the fruits of development.
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Reform era economic development and the partial retreat of the State from many areas of life have resulted in greater prosperity and the expansion of individual freedoms. Yet, some scholars argue that the transition from socialist collectivism to competitive market socialism has also created an ideological void. 49 Partially filled by a state-led "nationalist turn" post- 
